

# Seeking for tipping point in the housing market: evidences from a field experiment

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*This study econometrically assesses the presence of a tipping point on ethnic discrimination in the rental housing market. We measure discrimination and access to housing in New Caledonia by a large field experiment. Between 2015 and 2017, we sent six applications in response to 741 real-estate rental ads, for a total of 3,616 responses. Applicants have European, Kanak (the indigenous people) and Wallisian name and various signal of stability. Using data from the local census, we link the location of the offer and the neighbourhood composition. Probit random intercept regressions show that ethnic discrimination is stronger in neighbourhoods that are around the tipping point in ethnic composition.*

**Key words:** discrimination, rental market, tipping-point

**JEL Codes:** J15 R23 C93

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## Introduction

While there is a growing number of studies measuring discrimination in access to housing, there is still too little interest in the determinants of such discrimination, particularly the role played by the local composition of inhabitants in the local context. This effect could play a major impact on the segregation dynamic if discriminations affect more individuals belonging to ethnic minorities when they try to access a neighbourhood composed mainly of individuals from the major ethnicity. This phenomenon could occur if landlords have the will to maintain ethnic homogeneity in this type of neighbourhood in order to avoid outflows of individuals from the main ethnic group. Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) showed that in the United-States, white populations tend to leave cities with minority shares between 5% and 20%. As advocated by Hanson and Hawley (2011), landlords may want to prevent this phenomenon and, therefore, be more likely to discriminate in neighbourhoods which are close to the tipping point. While it is generally accepted that discrimination can reinforce residential segregation, the inverse link between local socio-ethnic composition and the intensity of discrimination is less explored. The question is whether discrimination amplifies the effect of segregating mechanisms or whether it reduces them.

To our knowledge, this article is the first to econometrically assess the presence of a tipping point of the ethnic discrimination in the rental housing market in an European context. We use a dataset of 3,616 observations created from a large field experiment to determine the relationship between ethnic discrimination in the rental housing market and the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood in New Caledonia. In this way, using census dataset from ISEE<sup>6</sup>, each observation is related to information on the composition of the neighbourhood in which the housing is located.

The scope of the study is the Greater Noumea, the capital of the French territory of New Caledonia. Three types of profile are tested: the Kanak, the Wallisian and the European applicant. These ethnic groups represent respectively 23 percent, 12 percent and 34 percent of the population in the agglomeration.<sup>7</sup> New Caledonia and more particularly the Greater Noumea area, has several aspects that are particularly interesting for our research project. First of all, it is both a European and Pacific territory, an ultra-peripheral one. Discrimination in access to housing has been little studied in Europe in relation to the United States. Secondly, it is the only territory in the French republican space, with French Polynesia, where we have ethnic statistics, which allow us to measure local ethnic distributions. We use these statistics to compare them with data from a discrimination test. Finally, the Nouméa agglomeration, where we are located, is a territory where the potentially discriminated population varies locally from a small minority to a large majority. We therefore have a wide spatial variety for

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<sup>7</sup> The rest of the population of the Greater Nouméa agglomeration are methis (10%), other ethnic groups (17%) and undeclared (3%).

our variable of interest, the local socio-ethnic composition. The high level of segregation in the Nouméa agglomeration means that it is perfectly suited for studying the link between ethnic environment and discrimination. In the southern part of this agglomeration, the share of the Kanak population is only 5 percent, whereas in the northern part of the agglomeration, which is only ten kilometers away, this proportion reaches 50 percent. Two signals of stability are also introduced, namely being civil servant and returning from Metropolitan France, in order to distinguish between the two core types of discrimination, which are: discrimination based on information and discrimination based on preferences.

The results indicate a strong discrimination against the Kanak applicant and even more against the Wallisian applicant. A stability signals increase the response rate more substantially for the Kanak applicant than for the European applicant, suggesting that both mechanisms driving discrimination are relevant, i.e. preference and information. We show that the discrimination against the Kanak applicant is highest in neighbourhoods where the concentration of Europeans is 1.75 to 2.1 times higher than the proportion of Europeans in Nouméa. However, we find no statistically significant links between discrimination and the concentration of Wallisians or Kanak.

The next section of the paper describes the context of the study. Section 2 is a discussion of the previous research on the presence of a tipping point on the discrimination in the housing market. Section 3 describes the experimental protocol and the data collection. Section 4 presents the results of the experiment and section 5 discuss the robustness of the results. We conclude in the final section of the paper.

## **1. Social and ethnic context of New Caledonia**

New Caledonia is one of the South Pacific region's largest economies. It sets itself apart from other French overseas communities and islands of Oceania by its high living standard and advanced human development. The last 25 years have been marked by important social and economic progress. However, Caledonian society is characterised by substantial inequalities. The standard of living increased at an annual rate of 1.3 per cent from 1991 to 2008, accompanied by deepening inequalities. In 2008, the standard of living of the richest 10 per cent was 7.9 times higher than the standard of living of the poorest 10 per cent. Ethnic background of inequalities is here very strong.

Indeed, similar to its neighbours, which have experienced comparable colonial settlements (Australia and New Zealand in particular), New Caledonia is characterized by cultural heterogeneity; Kanak (indigenous people) represent approximately 40 per cent of the population, compared with 12 per cent of other Pacific populations, 27 per cent of Europeans and 3 per cent of Asians. In these countries, groups suffering from lower socio-economic outcomes and discrimination are not immigrant minorities. That is, in New Caledonia, Kanak are the majority compared with other ethnic groups in the


country. New Caledonia also differs from most European countries in that ethnic groups are identified in official statistics; eight of the nine censuses held in New Caledonia since World War II (2004 is the exception) identify ethnic groups, which highlight the need for policies aimed to reduce gaps in social inequalities. This makes it possible to draw the ethnic composition of each neighbourhood and thus link discrimination in access to housing and ethnic segregation by place of residence.

Since the early 1990s, policies intended to reduce inequality have been implemented. Substantial social and economic policies favouring Kanak have accompanied the *Accord de Noumea* (signed in 1998) and, before that, the *Accords de Matignon* (signed in 1988). In relation to “closing the gap” policies and Kanak access to positions of responsibility in all areas of activity, rebalancing policies are most conspicuous in the areas of education and employment through the implementation of training programs, development of infrastructures and local employment protection policy. A more equitable distribution of resources, opportunities and power among ethnic groups is essential to ensure economic and social development of New Caledonia because high inequality threatens a country’s political stability, especially in this period of the history of New Caledonia (referendum on independence being held in 2018).

Although dramatic progress has been made in the area of school achievement, socio-economic indicators still differ widely across ethnic groups; Kanak remaining socially disadvantaged and discriminated on the labor market (Gorohouna et al., 2013). Bunel et al. (2017) show the differences in average socio-professional status by ethnic group, highlighting significant differences in level of school achievement and status on the job market.

Noumea, like many other Pacific cities, has remained for a long time a white city. Kanak remain very much in the minority in the Greater Noumea (about 10% in the early 1950s). From decades following, the phenomenon of urbanization of the indigenous population has increased and stabilized since the 1980s. As shown on Figure 1, the share of the urban Kanak population continues to increase; within the agglomeration, Kanak account for about one in four inhabitants.

Figure 1. Evolution of Kanak population in cities.



Wallisians and Futunians are the third largest community in the population of New Caledonia (8.6%) after Kanak and Europeans. Coming from several waves of immigration since the 1940s but also a high birth rate among this population, they are now more numerous than in Wallis and Futuna. Wallisians and Futunians are mainly present in Greater Nouméa (12.29% of the population) and more particularly in the three communes of the suburbs (Mont-Dore, Dumbéa and Païta).

New Caledonia is also characterized by a high level of ethnic and social segregation, in particular in the Greater Nouméa agglomeration, which includes the four most populated municipalities of New Caledonia: Nouméa, Mont Dore, Païta, and Dumbéa. Some 60% of the population and 73% of the jobs in the archipelago are concentrated in this area. The southern neighborhoods, with a very small proportion of social housing, very good quality and significantly more expensive rental housing, are predominantly European, sharply contrast with the northern neighborhoods, which are predominantly Kanak and characterized by a relatively high proportion of unsanitary housing and social housing. For the sake of social justice, promoting mixed neighbourhoods could fight against socio-economic and spatial segregation. This issue often goes along with by mobility, due to the distance of some neighbourhoods to business and employment places: the cost, the unreliability and the unavailability of public transport and the cost of the automobile constitute major obstacles to access to employment. By applying the usual Duncan and Duncan index of dissimilarity for the two groups, European and Kanak, Bunel et al (2017) measure the degree of segregation in the urban area of Nouméa and obtain an index of 50.8. That means one have to change of neighborhoods more than 50% of Kanak in order to produce a distribution that matches that of the European.

## 2. Overview of the literature

To objectively measure discrimination in access to housing, as well as in access to employment or other markets, the method used in the international literature is the testing method, which consists in comparing the responses obtained in response to a property advertisement by two candidates who are similar in all respects except for the characteristic whose effect is to be tested. This method has been applied in the United States since the 1980s and has provided multiple experimental evidence of discrimination in access to housing, particularly for the most studied ethno-racial discrimination (Yinger, 1986; Page, 1995; Choi et al., 2005; Hanson & Hawley, 2011). It has also been applied, to a lesser extent, in many European countries: first in Sweden by Ahmed et al, (2008 and 2010), Bengtsson et al, (2012) and Carlsson & Eriksson (2014), then in Spain by Bosch et al (2010), in Italy by Baldini & Federici (2011), in Greece by Drydakis (2011), in Norway by Beatty and Sommervoll (2012), in Belgium, by Heylen et al (2015), in France by Acolin, Bostic, and Painter (2016), and in Germany by Auspurg, Hinz, and Schmid (2017). With the widespread use of the Internet and real estate ad sites, the correspondence test, which consists of sending fictitious request emails, has emerged as the most effective way to conduct tests on the housing market. In a recent overview, Flage (2018) identifies 29 scientific studies that have applied this method in 15 different countries. It concludes that candidates who report a foreign origin by the sound of their surname are on average half as likely to be invited to visit rented accommodation as majority candidates.

In this field of research, there has been an impressive increase in the number of publications. Most of these publications focus on proving the existence and measuring the intensity of discrimination. They highlight that minorities are victims of differential treatment in the real estate market. Overall, visible minority candidates are contacted less often and the number and quality of assets referred to them is lower.

For economists, in particular, the identification of discrimination indicates an anomaly in the functioning of the housing market and the existence and extent of such an anomaly is an interesting subject in itself. But it is clear that we must go further and explain the origin and causes of this type of anomaly if we want to be able to propose actions to effectively combat this type of problem. In this perspective, too little work is done on the determinants, let alone on how to fight discrimination.

We focus here on an essential determinant: the local socio-ethnic composition. This corresponds to the proportion of potential discriminated persons in the local population, which is frequently measured with segregation indices, such as Duncan and Duncan, which is one of the most widely used. Discrimination has multiple relationships with the local segregation thus measured. On the one hand, it is clear that strong discrimination on the basis of socio-ethnic origin can strengthen and amplify the processes that generate and maintain local ethnic segregation. On the other hand, local ethnic

segregation can in turn influence the intensity of discrimination. We are interested in this particular meaning of causality, which ranges from segregation to discrimination. When the potentially discriminated minority is very present locally, does this promote or limit discrimination? It seems to us that the answer to this question is not obvious. However, this is an important question if we want to know whether discriminatory behaviour in access to housing is more a role as an amplifier or attenuator of socio-spatial segregation.

Three sets of determinants have been given by the literature applied to the question of the effects of segregation on discrimination. These determinants have been given successively by research studies that have analysed the existence of discrimination in the housing market. Early studies have generally shown that discrimination in the housing market can vary depending on the characteristics of the landlord, the type of property rented, the signal of social integration and/or economic stability transmitted by the applicant. The intensity of discrimination (D1) then depends on many factors that are not necessarily related to the local socio-ethnic composition of the neighbourhood of residence. Discriminated populations are discriminated against Becker-style by housing providers, to which Arrow-Phelps is added when minorities are presumed to be occupants of lower quality housing. These studies suggest that minorities can be discriminated against regardless of the social and ethnic composition of the neighbourhood. In line with Schelling's (1971) model of residential segregation without any discriminatory behaviour in the housing market, discrimination can be considered independent of the socio-ethnic composition of the territory.

**Hypothesis 1.** *Ethno-racial minorities are potentially discriminated against in the housing market for any social and ethnic composition of the neighbourhood of residence*

In the United States, the first studies to take into account the ethnic environment at a disaggregated level are those of Yinger (1986), Page (1995) and Roychoudhury & Goodman (1996). For Yinger, the root cause of discrimination is economic: real estate agents discriminate to avoid racial prejudice for their white clients. This is the hypothesis of racial prejudice suffered by the clientele. Ondrich et al (1999) clearly indicate that "If an agent's customer base is largely white, he may discriminate in order to appease actual and potential customers, keeping the group that supplies most of his business feeling comfortable". This is customer discrimination as identified by Neumark et al. (1996) in the labour market. Landlords and real estate agents will discriminate less against minorities in neighbourhoods where they are strongly represented because they will consider that these spaces constitute neighbourhoods adapted to the lives of these minorities. According to this mechanism (D2), there is a mechanical link between the local socio-ethnic composition and the intensity of discrimination. The minority group will potentially be all the more discriminated against as the majority group represents a significant proportion of the local population.

**Hypothesis 2.** *Due to potential racial prejudice, there is a growing monotonous link between the proportion of residents from the majority population and the intensity of discrimination in access to housing.*


In Schelling's (1971) models, the location choices of socio-ethnic groups are not linear. There is a tipping point corresponding to a given proportion of the minority group beyond which members of the majority group will make the choice to leave the neighbourhood irreversibly. If landlords and real estate agents have this model in mind, they will try to protect themselves from the risk of losing their customers by discriminating more strongly against the minority when its proportion approaches the tipping point. Once the threshold is exceeded, it is no longer useful for owners to discriminate against minorities. This suggests a non-linear relationship around the tipping point. This hypothesis of non-linearity (D3) has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies in the United States. Page (1995) showed that the relationship was non-linear, around a tipping point level of around 20%. Discrimination increases until the share of the African-American minority reaches this critical mass, then declines sharply. Ondrich et al (1999) use indicator sets for the proportion of households from the minority group of 0 to 20% and above 20% in the belief that real estate agents will change discriminatory behaviour around this threshold for fear of losing their clients from the majority white group. As soon as the proportion of residents from the black minority group exceeds the threshold, the incentive to discriminate disappears. The study by Card et al (2008) is probably the one that most convincingly confirmed the discriminatory consequences of the tipping point hypothesis by using direct observations of household residential mobility. It places the tipping point at a variable level depending on the city, usually between 5 and 20%. This will be confirmed by the work of Hanson and Hawley (2011), for whom discrimination is becoming more pronounced around the "tipping points", corresponding to a share of the population from the majority group of between 80% and 95%. Hanson and Santos (2014) using larger samples will in turn confirm that landlords begin to discriminate strongly when the proportion of people from the minority group becomes too large for them.

**Hypothesis 3.** *There is a Schelling tipping point beyond which the socio-ethnic composition of the neighbourhood can change. To protect themselves against this, suppliers discriminate significantly below this threshold and they stop discriminating beyond it. The result is a local area of non-linearity in the relationship between segregation and discrimination.*

These three sets of determinants are perfectly compatible with each other. We represent them in the diagram below, assuming that they can be combined. The overall relationship between the majority group's share in a given neighbourhood and the intensity of discrimination. In a plan where the share

of the majority group in the local population is shown on the abscissa and the extent of discrimination on the ordinate, the combination of the three hypotheses leads to a particular profile: the curve has a positive ordinate (D1), it is generally monotonous increasing (D2) with a local area of non-linearity in case of the presence of a tipping point (D3) (figure 2).

**Figure 2. The segregation effect on discrimination**



All this work is American. In European countries, there is much less studies providing evidence of a relationship between discrimination and the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood. Auspurg, Hinz, and Schmid (2017) found no significant discrimination toward Turkish applicants in Germany in area where the proportion of Turks is low. Bunel et al (2017) found no significant discrimination toward Kanak in New Caledonia in neighbourhoods where the proportion of Kanak is higher than 25%. Baldini and Federici (2011) in Italia, Carlsson and Eriksson (2014) in Sweden and Acolin, Bostic, and Painter (2016) show regional or local variations in the level of discrimination and suggest that these variations could be explained by the demographic composition of the places. To our knowledge, no study in the European context provides statistical proofs of a relationship between discrimination and the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood.

## 2. Experimental Protocol and Data Collection

The experiment is an extension of the one conducted by Bunel et al. (2017) in Greater Nouméa between October 2015 and February 2016. The second part of the experiment that took place one year later, between October 2016 and February 2017. It allows to collect more observations and to add new profiles.

The test is conducted to determine access to private housing for rent and therefore do not covers access to social housing and private homes which are indeed rare in the area. We tested all ads for apartments for rent in Greater Nouméa published on the reference site <http://www.immobilier.nc/>, which centralizes all real-estate offers in New Caledonia.<sup>8</sup> The applicants for rental housing were men, making their Kanak, Wallisian or European origin known through their surnames and first names. The choice of the surnames and first names corresponds to credible and realistic identities. They are among the most common first names for this age-group and for the community to which they belong. Surnames unambiguously indicate that a person is of Kanak, Wallisian or European background. The order of the response of each type of applicant was randomly changed daily throughout the data collection period. The test consisted of ending short and interrogative e-mails in response to ads published with a view to requesting a housing unit visit. The following messages were sent:

*Dear Sir or Madam:*

*Your ad fits the requirement that I am seeking. I would like to arrange a visit to see the apartment.*

*What documents do you require?*

*Thank you,*

*First Name and Surname (our translation)*

In order to differentiate statistical discrimination from discrimination based on preference we crossed the ethnicity signal with a signal concerning the financial and professional stability of the applicant. The following sentence was added to messages sent by some of our fictitious applicants: “I am a civil servant and I have just moved to Noumea.” This unambiguously signalled employment stability and on average a higher salary, given the indexation policy that exists in this area. To control for the implicit signal of the move from metropolitan France, we also add a Kanak applicant who indicates a return from metropolitan France.

As such, four rental applicant profiles were created in the first wave of the experiment (A—European, B—European civil servant, C—Kanak, and D—Kanak civil servant). Two applicant profiles were added

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<sup>8</sup> The internet is not the only channel through which housing offers are advertised. Other channels such as newspapers and social networks were not taken into account in this study. In addition, in the case of real estate agencies, we retained only one offer per agency to avoid detection.

in the second wave of the experiment (E—Kanak back from metropolitan France and F—Wallisian). In the end, our base contained 3,762 responses to 741 real-estate ads ( $4 \times 342 + 6 \times 399$ ).<sup>9</sup>

The geographical area we are considering is composed of the city of Nouméa and the municipalities of Païta, Mont-Doré and Païta. Nouma is a relatively dense city composed of 8 sectors subdivided into 37 districts. We have grouped these neighbourhoods and the three neighbouring cities into 14 homogeneous units according to by grouping the least populated contiguous areas.

### 3. Results

#### Aggregate results

Table 1 shows the results of landlords' responses to our applications for each wave of test separately and the aggregate result for the two waves. The ranking of applicants who receive the more responses is similar in both waves. The European civil servant receives the highest rate of positive responses (69%), followed by the European applicant without stability signal (66%), the Kanak civil servant (60%) and the Kanak without stability signal (50%). With regard to the new applicants of the second wave, we find that the Kanak who signals a recent return from metropolitan France receives a positive response rate of 52%. The Wallisian applicant is the least contacted of the applicants with a positive response rate of 43%.

**Table 1: Positive responses by wage and by applicant**

	(1) European		(2) European civil servant		(3) Kanak civil servant		(4) Kanak		(5) Kanak back from metropolitan France		(6) Wallisian	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Positive response rate (first wave)	67.58	46.88	70.00	45.90	65.36	47.65	54.10	49.91				
<i>Observations</i>	330		330		332		329					
Positive response rate (second wave)	64.16	48.01	68.17	46.64	54.33	49.90	47.37	49.99	51.63	50.04	42.61	49.51
<i>Observations</i>	399		399		300		399		399		399	
Positive response rate	65.71	47.50	69.00	46.28	60.13	49.00	50.41	50.03	51.63	50.04	42.61	49.51
<i>Observations</i>	729		729		632		728		399		399	

<sup>9</sup> 12 ads for which the landlord call the applicants without leaving a message are excluded of the sample.

**Figure 3: Positive response rates by profile of applicant**




Table 2 compares the positive response rates received by the different profiles of applicants. As Bunel et al. (2017) show, the effect of the stability signal appears to be more valued by landlords for a Kanak than for an European applicant: the difference in response rate is 3 percentage points between the two European applicants against 10 percentage points between the two Kanak applicants. The Kanak civil servant has then a 9 percentage points lower rate of response than his European counterpart. It is a smaller difference than the 15 percentage points difference between the European and Kanak applicants without stability signals.

These results are in line with the coexistence of two types of discrimination. The difference of response rate between Europeans and Kanak that decreases sharply with the stability signal, such as being civil servant, indicates the presence of statistical discrimination. The significant difference between the European and the Kanak civil servant applicant suggests, to a less extent, existence of a discrimination based on preference.

The Kanak applicant who signals a recent return from metropolitan France gets a small increase in his response rate compared to the Kanak applicant without any signal. The response rate of the Wallisian applicant is 26 percentage points lower than that of the European civil servant and 23 percentage points lower than that of the European applicant. The response rate of the Wallisian is also 8 percentage points lower than the response rate of the Kanak applicant.

We thus find high levels of discrimination in line with works of Carpusor Adrian G. and Loges William E. (2006) who find a 33 percentage points lower response rate for African-Americans in the US or Ali M. Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) who find a 24.8 percentage point lower response rate for Arabic/Muslim male names compared to Swedish male names in Sweden.

**Table 2: Differences in the Success Rates of Applicants**

	Deviation (in Percentage Points)	Standard- Error	Student	P-value
<b>European civil servant versus</b>				
European	3.29**	1.37	2.40	0.016
Kanak civil servant	8.87***	1.83	4.85	0.000
Kanak back from Metropolitan France	17.37***	2.45	7.09	0.000
Kanak	18.58***	1.79	10.39	0.000
Wallisian	26.39***	2.56	10.33	0.000
<b>European versus</b>				
Kanak	15.29***	1.79	8.55	0.000
Wallisian	23.09***	2.56	9.04	0.000
Non-euro (Kanak or Wallisian)	18.06***	1.75	10.33	0.000

\*\*\* Significant at the 1%, \*\* de 5%, \* de 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the landlord level.

Table 3 presents the econometric confirmation of the results presented previously. Average marginal effects from probit regressions are displayed in column (1) and (2) and from random effects probit models in column (3) and (4). Outcomes that are related to a same offer are not independent which is taken into account into the random effects probit. Intraclass correlation is around 0.8 in model (3) and (4) which means that 80% of the variance of the probability of any of the fictitious applicants being contacted by the landlord is due to the behaviour of the landlord. The relevance of model (3) and (4) are confirmed by likelihood ratio tests that reject the nullity of the intraclass correlation at the 5% level.

Results indicate that a Kanak has a 14 percentage points lower probability of obtaining a positive response compared to an European. The response probability of a Wallisian is even lower with a 4 percentage points reduction compared to the probability of a Kanak and a 19 percentage points reduction compared to the probability of an European applicant. Stability signals increase the probability for a Kanak to obtain a positive response of 7 percentage points for the quality of civil servant and by 4 percentage points for the recent return form metropolitan France. The stability signal affects to a lesser extent the European for whom the signal increases the probability of obtaining a positive response by 3 percentage points.

**Table 3: Average Marginal Effects of the Ethnic and Stability Signals**

	(1) Probit	(2) Probit	(3) Probit RE	(4) Probit RE
European	0.150*** (0.017)	0.153*** (0.018)	0.143*** (0.017)	0.145*** (0.017)
Civil Servant	0.094*** (0.016)	0.091*** (0.017)	0.077*** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.016)
European × Civil servant	-0.059** (0.022)	-0.057** (0.023)	-0.041* (0.022)	-0.039* (0.023)
Back from metropolitan France	0.012 (0.023)	0.041** (0.020)	0.036* (0.019)	0.040** (0.019)
Wallisian	-0.075** (0.023)	-0.047** (0.020)	-0.044** (0.019)	-0.042** (0.019)
Control variables	NO	YES	NO	YES
AIC	4808.395	4536.642	3444.898	3267.672
Number of observations	3,616	3,449	3,616	3,453


*Notes: \*\*\* Significant at the 1%, \*\* de 5%, \* de 10% levels. Standard errors clustered at the landlord level in parentheses. Control variables are: type of landlord (agency or individual), gender of the landlord, log of the average rent price in the neighbourhood, kitchen in the housing, type of housing (F1,F2...), order of the e-mail, e-mail game, wave of the test (first or second wave).*

### Effect of the neighbourhood composition

We are now interested in the effect of the neighbourhood's composition on discrimination. Figure 4 plots the relationship between the difference in response rates of two applicants and the concentration of European in the neighbourhood. The concentration of European is measured by the location quotient<sup>10</sup> for each of the fourteen neighbourhoods defined above. Despite the low number of points, there seems to be an increase of the discrimination towards the different profiles of non-European applicants when the concentration of Europeans increases.

<sup>10</sup> The location quotient is the ratio between the proportion of the ethnic group in the spatial unit and the proportion of the ethnic group in the city. A location quotient lower than 1 indicates that the ethnic group is underrepresented in the spatial unit relatively to the composition of the total population. A location quotient equal to 1 indicates that the share of the ethnic group in the spatial unit is identical to the share of the ethnic group in the total population. A location quotient higher than 1 indicates an overrepresentation of the ethnic group.

**Figure 4: Discrimination and concentration of Europeans**



*Notes: Differences of response rates between each profiles and the European applicant without stability signal are presented except for the Kanak civil servant whose response rate is compared to the European civil servant.*

In order to test econometrically the significance and shape of the relation between the neighbourhood's composition and the level of discrimination we estimate random effects probit models that include interaction terms between discrimination and concentration of Europeans. In Table 4, column (1) tests the presence of a linear relationship between discrimination and concentration of Europeans. The variable LQ European that measures the location quotient of European in each neighbourhood is then introduced as well as a cross effect between the variable and the response to the European applicant. In column (2) we test for an increase of the discrimination around the tipping point that is for neighbourhoods that have a concentration of Europeans more than 1.75 above the mean concentration of Europeans. This effect is catch by the variable Dum LQ European >1.75 which takes 1 for neighbourhoods that have a location quotient above 1.75 and 0 otherwise and by the interaction between this variable and the variable of response to the European applicant. In column (3) we test for a change in the relationship around the tipping point. In this way we introduce the variable LQ European, the variable LQ European >1.75 that takes LQ European - 1.75 for neighbourhoods where LQ European > 1.75.

We observe no significant linear relationship between discrimination and the concentration of Europeans. However results in column (2) indicate a significant increase of 7 percentage points of the discrimination in neighbourhoods where the concentration of Europeans is higher than 1.75. We see in column (3) a change in the relationship around the tipping point: discrimination does not vary significantly with the neighbourhood composition before 1.75 but increases significantly above this point. We may note that a model that includes both a shift in the discrimination and a break in the trend at 1.75 (not shown) does not perform better in term of information criteria. Based on the information criteria we keep column (2) and thus a shift in the discrimination at the tipping point as our preferred specification.


In order to check that the relationship is not due to a correlation between the concentration of Europeans and some other characteristics of the neighbourhood as the average rental price, we add in column (3) and (4) the log of the average rental price and its interaction with discrimination. The results are not dramatically modified by this introduction.  $\text{European} \times \text{Dum LQ European} > 1.75$  et  $\text{European} \times \text{LQ European} > 1.75$  are still significant at the 10% level. The decrease in significance is due to an increase of the standard errors but not to a decrease of the estimated coefficients which can be explained by the collinearity between the average rental price and the concentration of Europeans. The parametric relationship between discrimination and concentration of Europeans is shown in figure 5.

**Table 4: Effect of the composition of the neighbourhood on discrimination  
(average marginal effects)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
European	0.114** (0.036)	0.130*** (0.019)	0.148*** (0.042)	0.313 (0.986)	-0.336 (1.220)
Civil servant	0.074*** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.016)
European ×Civil servant	-0.039* (0.023)	-0.038* (0.023)	-0.038* (0.023)	-0.038* (0.023)	-0.038* (0.023)
Metropolitan	0.039** (0.019)	0.038** (0.019)	0.039** (0.019)	0.039** (0.019)	0.039** (0.019)
Wallisian	-0.043** (0.019)	-0.043** (0.019)	-0.043** (0.019)	-0.043** (0.019)	-0.043** (0.019)
LQ European	-0.088** (0.043)	-0.074 (0.046)	-0.079* (0.048)	-0.073 (0.046)	-0.075 (0.049)
European ×LQ Euroean	0.024 (0.024)		-0.015 (0.033)		-0.027 (0.045)
Dum LQ European >1.75		-0.038 (0.053)		-0.041 (0.055)	
European ×Dum LQ European >1.75		0.066** (0.032)		0.072* (0.043)	
LQ European >1.75			-0.054 (0.181)		-0.050 (0.181)
European ×LQ European >1.75			0.283* (0.156)		0.274* (0.158)
Log(average rental price in the neighbourhood)	0.454** (0.188)	0.465** (0.194)	0.445** (0.192)	0.474** (0.201)	0.422** (0.200)
European ×log(average rental price in the neighbourhood)				-0.024 (0.130)	0.065 (0.165)
Control variables	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
AIC	3270.135	3264.298	3266.038	3266.247	3267.816
Number of observations	3,453	3,453	3,453	3,453	3,453

*Notes: Standard errors clustered at the landlord level in parentheses. Control variables are: type of landlord (agency or individual), gender of the landlord, log of the average rent price in the neighbourhood, kitchen in the housing, type of housing (F1,F2...), order of the e-mail, e-mail game, wave of the test (first or second wave).*

**Figure 5: Difference in positive response probability between the Kanak and the European applicant and neighbourhood composition.**



#### 4. Robustness

In this section, we check for the relevance of alternative tipping points and specifications. In column (1) of table 5 we try to delimit more precisely the tipping point. Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) have shown that the tipping point was generally situated between 5% and 20% of Afro-Americans in the United-States. Neighbourhoods where the concentration of Europeans is very high may not be affected by a high level of discrimination because their diversity is not important enough so that a newcomer of a different ethnicity might lead the departures of individuals of the major ethnic group. We thus test for a lower level of discrimination in the 10% neighbourhoods with the highest levels of Europeans' concentration relatively to the 15% following neighbourhoods.<sup>11</sup> Results support a lower level of discrimination in the more concentrated neighbourhoods compared to those that are slightly more diversified. We also test in columns (2), (3) and (4) for shifts in the discrimination at different level of concentration (location quotients of 0.75, 1 and 1.5). No significant shift in the discrimination is observable at these levels.

<sup>11</sup> This distinction is, however, limited by the few number of neighbourhoods.

**Table 5: Test for different tipping points**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
European	0.130*** (0.019)	0.157*** (0.030)	0.140*** (0.026)	0.137*** (0.022)
Civil servant	0.074*** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.016)
European ×Civil servant	-0.039* (0.023)	-0.039* (0.023)	-0.039* (0.023)	-0.039* (0.023)
Metropolitan	0.038** (0.019)	0.040** (0.019)	0.039** (0.019)	0.039** (0.019)
Wallisian	-0.043** (0.019)	-0.042** (0.019)	-0.042** (0.019)	-0.043** (0.019)
LQ European	-0.078* (0.046)	-0.202** (0.067)	-0.130** (0.062)	0.014 (0.060)
1.75 < Dum LQ European < 2.1	-0.066 (0.059)			
European ×1.75< Dum LQ European < 2.1	0.081** (0.040)			
Dum LQ European >= 2.1	0.013 (0.068)			
European ×Dum LQ European >= 2.1	0.046 (0.047)			
Dum LQ European > 0.75		0.139** (0.059)		
European ×Dum LQ European > 0.75		-0.016 (0.031)		
Dum LQ European > 1			0.066 (0.061)	
European ×Dum LQ European > 1			0.008 (0.028)	
Dum LQ European > 1.5				-0.160** (0.068)
European ×Dum LQ European > 1.5				0.018 (0.027)
AIC	3266.760	3264.632	3268.888	3264.681
Number of observations	3,453	3,453	3,453	3,453

*Notes: Standard errors clustered at the landlord level in parentheses. Control variables are: type of landlord (agency or individual), gender of the landlord, log of the average rent price in the neighbourhood, kitchen in the housing, type of housing (F1, F2...), order of the e-mail, e-mail game, wave of the test (first or second wave).*

## **Conclusion**

Despite its importance in political discourse, the disparity issue in New Caledonia lacks from precise measures of the current situation. However, policy debates on reducing inequalities and discrimination require specific analysis and thus would benefit from a better understanding of the factors that affect all kind of discrimination and segregation. This study, which aim is to analyse ethnic discrimination in the housing market, will contribute to a better understanding of the situation to drive social policies.. More specifically, our objective is to give empirical evidence on the effect of neighbourhood composition on these discriminations. The analyses use the results of correspondence tests for European, Kanak and Wallisian applicants on more than 700 ads in the greater Noumea. Linking this data set to information about the neighbourhoods in which the rental properties are located, we are able to econometrically test, for the first time in an European context, the effect of the ethnic composition of the area on discrimination.

Our results show significant discrimination by landlords against e-mail inquiries from Kanak and Wallisian applicants in the rental housing market. Discrimination diminishes but does not disappear when the European applicant and the Kanak applicant give signals of stability. This result confirms the presence of statistical discrimination but also indicates, to a lesser extent, the presence of preference based discrimination.

We reject at the 5 percent level the homogeneity of discrimination according to the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood. We find that discrimination is higher in neighbourhoods where the share of Europeans is between 1.75 and 2.1 times higher than in the city as a whole. The share of Europeans in the area is 34 percent and we can thus identify a tipping point between 60% and 72% knowing that only one neighbourhood has a share of Europeans higher than 72%.

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## Annexe

Table A1: Characteristics of Offers

Characteristics of the offer and the company	First wave		Second wave	
	In % of Offers	Standard deviation	In % of Offers	Standard deviation
<b>Type of landlord</b>				
Agencies	19		11	
Individuals	81		89	
<b>Size of apartments</b>				
F1	16		20	
F2	38		39	
F3	30		26	
F4	16		15	
LOFT	0		0	
Game A	44		50	
Male landlord	51		50	
Kitchen in the house	92		99	
Rent	133,803	57,392	116,172	41,290
Surface	65	29	63	34
Average price per m2 (CFP franc)	2,192	548	2,089	694
Observations	1,368		2,394	